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Revisiting Aquinas on Providence
and Rising to the Challenge of Divine
Action in Nature*
Ignacio Silva / Harris Manchester College,
University of OxfordIt seems that were God to intervene within nature, God would be break-
ing, suspending, or simply not following the apparent lawful order of the
created universe, which, for many, would imply an inconsistency in God’s
nature. Moreover, the idea of God acting directly in nature seems to bring
challenges to the autonomy of nature and thus to the foundation of the
natural sciences. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to formulate an account
of how it is possible to understand that nature has its own laws and regular
activities together with the claim that God can participate actively in the
production of natural effects: the God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
is not a God of the sidelines.
In the past two and a half decades, some theologians working within the
framework of the project “Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,” cospon-
sored by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Nat-
ural Sciences in Berkeley, have advanced many innovative proposals to solve
this crucial issue. Scholars participating in these debates included Robert
Russell, Thomas Tracy, John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke, Philip Clay-
ton, Nancey Murphy, and, within diverse Thomist circles, William Stoeger,
William E. Carroll, and Michael Dodds.1
* I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers who commented on this article and to Peter
Harrison and William E. Carroll for their comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.© 2014 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0022-4189/2014/9403-0001$10.00
1 This project consisted of five conferences over ten years, in which overlaps between science
ðchaos and complexity theories, quantum physics, cosmology, evolutionary biology, and neu-
roscienceÞ and theology of divine action were considered, with six published volumes, edited
principally by Robert Russell, including all the contributions to the conferences. For a full
review of the project, see Robert Russell, “Challenge and Progress in ‘Theology and Science’:
An Overview of the VO/CTNS Series,” in Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action: Twenty Years of
Challenge and Progress, ed. R. Russell, N. Murphy, and W. Stoeger ðRome: Vatican Observatory–
CTNS, 2008Þ, 3–56. The goal of this essay is to offer a new account of divine action to solve the
questions raised in this project.
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The goal of this project was to explain how God can act within nature
in ways that would help history to develop in the directions he wants but
The Journal of Religionwithout disrupting the created order. The debate makes use of the notion
of special divine action—or special providence—to find ways to think and
talk about divine action in a world that is described by the natural sciences
without reference to particular divine interventions within the course of
natural events ðin the sense of what is commonly understood to be a mir-
acleÞ. Simply put, scholars wanted to explain how God not only creates and
sustains the universe ðto what “general divine action” refersÞ but also guides
history through introducing novelty in nature.2 General divine action does
not seem to be sufficient to explain the introduction of novelty in nature
because it does not appear to offer ways in which God acts here and now
directly in nature, for example, to respond to petitionary prayer.3
The program followed to explain God’s introduction of novelty in the
universe was that which Robert Russell called NIODA: the search for a
noninterventionist, objective, divine action. If God providentially guides
the universe in ways that go beyond the mere creation and conservation in
a nonintrusive way, the universe should offer something like ontological
causal gaps within which God could perform these types of actions, inter-
acting with creation without intrusion of the laws of nature. Russell’s pro-
posal, as well as Thomas Tracy’s, follows the emergence of the indetermin-
istic account of nature given by the development of quantum mechanics
in the twentieth century, exploring the possibility of an understanding of
divine action through quantum events. John Polkinghorne argued for di-
vine action through input of information in chaotic systems; Arthur Pea-
cocke suggested models of top-down divine causation; Philip Clayton held
that theories of emergence could be regarded as viable paths to think new
models of divine action; and Nancey Murphy, together with George Ellis,
proposed a model for divine action in the human brain through the open-
ness offered by quantum mechanics. The basic idea is that nature offers, at
least at some level of reality ðthe level will vary according to each authorÞ, in-
determinacy, openness, and potentiality. Nature offers events that are insuf-
ficient to cause future events, or events that are not sufficiently caused by pre-
vious events. In these models, God would act directly to determine what
is left underdetermined within the order of nature, choosing which out-
come offered by the underdetermination of nature to bring about with-
out disrupting any law of nature ðbecause the very laws of nature present
this indetermination, openness, or potentialityÞ. God, in Thomas Tracy’s
words, “may act to ensure the occurrence of an event for which created causes
2 Authors within this debate want to avoid an interventionist account of divine action be-
cause, typically, there are no good reasons to accept that divine interventions of the natural
order ever happen.3 To the best of my knowledge, Thomas Tracy offers the latest defense of the necessity of this
distinction and of special divine action in “Scientific Vetoes and the Hands-Off God: Can We
Say that God Acts in History?,” Theology and Science 10, no. 1 ð2012Þ: 56–78.
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ðoperating under the conditions established by the world’s actual history
to dateÞ are insufficient.”4
Revisiting Aquinas on ProvidenceIt is not my intention here to advance objections to these proposals, many
have been raised already. Scholars have pointed out several issues with these
suggestions, the most central of which I consider to be the idea that God’s
action is conceived as any creature’s action ða “cause among causes”Þ.5 I do
believe, however, that their motivation and intuition are important and
can be helpful to understand how and why Thomas Aquinas’s doctrines
are still relevant for today’s theological enterprise. These proposals sought
to preserve the providential character of God’s action. That is, the fact that
God is actively guiding the world toward its end, and that this action is
not only a general and universal action, but that it is intentional and to-
ward the particular. In other words, the “specialness” of God’s special action
is rooted in the intentionality and providential character of God’s action
and not in the different instantiations of this type of action. My goal, then,
is to show how Aquinas’s doctrine of providence, which follows his own
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo,6 mainly as expressed in his De potentia Dei,
fulfills all the necessary criteria set by today’s debate for a complete ac-
count of divine action, namely, that God’s action, while not being mistaken
for a creaturely action, is providential in the sense that God is active, not
only with regards to the general and universal, but that God is involved in
the individual and particular, here and now.7
5 In Russell’s case, for example, he asserts that, while he wants to find a way in which to
4 Ibid., 59.understand God’s action as compatible with current scientific theory, natural causes are that
which act according to the scientific theories. If the only alternative we have is to accept that
God should act according to the scientific theory, and the theory is, following Russell, what tells
us what a natural action is, I do not see how we can avoid the conclusion that God’s action
should be considered an action as any natural cause’s action. This is to say that God acts as
any natural cause acts, in this case, at the quantum level of reality. See Robert Russell, “Quan-
tum Physics and the Theology of Non-interventionist Objective Divine Action,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2006Þ,
579–95. Tracy ð“Scientific Vetoes and the Hands-Off God,” 61Þ has made this conclusion ex-
plicit, perhaps inadvertently, when claiming that “we have good reason not to deny that God
might act among secondary causes to affect the ongoing course of events.” See also William E.
Carroll, “Divine Agency, Contemporary Physics, and the Autonomy of Nature,”Heythrop Journal
49, no. 4 ð2008Þ: 582–602; Michael Dodds, OP, “Unlocking Divine Causality: Aquinas, Con-
temporary Science, and Divine Action,”Angelicum 86 ð2009Þ: 67–86; Ignacio Silva, “John Polking-
horne on Divine Action: A Coherent Theological Evolution,” Science and Christian Belief 24,
no. 1 ð2012Þ: 19–30; Taede A. Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God: Divine Action and Scientism
ðLeuven: Peeters, 2004Þ; Elizabeth A. Johnson, “Does God Play Dice? Divine Providence and
Chance,”Theological Studies 56 ð1996Þ: 3–18.
6 Lydia Jaeger has recently suggested having the Christian doctrine of creation as the starting
point for this kind of discussions. See her “Against Physicalism-Plus-God: How Creation Ac-
counts for Divine Action in Nature’s World,” Faith and Philosophy 29, no. 3 ð2012Þ: 295–312.
7 Michael Dodds, OP, has recently published his Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science
and Thomas Aquinas ðWashington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012Þ, an out-
standing work on these issues from a Thomistic perspective. I believe, however, that a closer
look at De potentia Dei ðhereafter cited as De pot.Þ can add some more detail to the discussion, as
I hope will be evident by the end of this essay.
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For Aquinas, God’s creation of the universe is to be understood as the
production of the total existence of being. Since giving being—that is,
The Journal of Religioncreating—implies the totality of being, the creature has a relation of total
and complete dependence on God. That is, God is the primary cause of all
things because what God causes is the very existence of all things, without
which things would simply not exist. In this sense, created beings, referred
to as secondary causes, cannot do anything if it is not by the primary cause.
The key feature of this doctrine is that everything that the secondary cause
is and does is caused by the primary cause. Acknowledging that the ques-
tion of divine action is far from having an easy solution,8 Aquinas teaches
that the primary cause continuously acts in the created universe, without
mixing his actions with those of natural created agents, that is, without
confounding natural and divine actions. I shall dedicate the rest of this
essay to elucidating this idea, with the hope that my analysis will illuminate
today’s discussions on divine action and special providence.
I. GOD’S ACTION IN NATUREIn the seventh article of the third question of De potentia Dei, Aquinas sug-
gests that in order to explain that natural agents act with their own causal
powers it is necessary to affirm that these causal powers are also created and
thus dependent on God for their existence. In the same way that natural
agents exist insofar as God gives them their being, they act insofar as God
provides them with their causal power, and thus God acts as being the cause
of the action of natural agents. But, Aquinas argues, to be the cause of the
action of something else can be understood in four different ways.9 First, it
can be understood as giving the causal power to act: every operation con-
sequent to a certain causal power is ascribed to the giver of that causal
power as an effect to a cause. All causal power of any agent whatsoever is
from God. In this way, God causes all the actions of nature, because he gives
natural things the powers by which they are able to act.
Second, God may be said to be the cause of an action by upholding the
natural causal power in its being. Every action that cannot continue after
the influence of a certain agent has ceased, is from that agent: the pre-
server of a causal power is said to cause the action of that power, just as a
remedy that preserves sight is said to make a man see. God not only gives
existence to things when they first began to exist but also causes existence
in them as long as they exist by preserving them in existence. So God is
8 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles ðSCGÞ III, 70: “Some find it difficult to understand how
natural effects are ascribed to God and to natural agents.” ðAll texts of Aquinas were retrieved
from Corpus Thomisticum, ed. Enrique Alarco´n ½Pamplona: University of Navarre, 2000; all
translations are my own.Þ Dodds ðUnlocking Divine Action, 207Þ has wittily affirmed that this is
“perhaps one of his greatest understatements.”
9 See also Aquinas, SCG III, 67.
280
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Sat, 10 Oct 2015 09:22:05 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
continuously causing the causal powers in them, together with their exis-
tence. In this second sense, therefore, every operation of a thing is reduc-
Revisiting Aquinas on Providenceible to God as its cause. I will call these two ways the founding moments of
God acting in and through natural agents.
The remaining two ways will be regarded as the dynamic moments of God
acting in and through natural agents. Until only recently, these two ways
were not explicit in any Thomistic account of divine action ðarguing for or
against itÞ within the contemporary debate.10 Their importance lies in the
fact that through them Aquinas is able to argue for a special and provident
divine action, which is exactly what the contemporary debate is trying to
explain. Aquinas’s third way of understanding God’s action in the created
universe is as follows: a thing is said to cause another’s action by moving it
to act. Here Aquinas does not mean that it causes or preserves the causal
power ðas in the founding momentsÞ but rather that the cause applies an-
other’s causal power to action, as a man causes the knife’s cutting by the
very fact that he applies the sharpness of the knife to cutting by moving it
to cut, for example, a loaf of bread. Since the lower nature in acting does
not act except through being moved,11 God causes the action of every nat-
ural thing by moving and applying its power to action.
Finally, one thing causes the action of another as a principal agent causes
the action of its instrument: and in this way again, Aquinas argues, God
causes every action of all natural things. Every natural thing is a being, and
everything that acts in a certain way causes being.12 Being, however, is the
most common first effect and more intimate than all other effects, where-
fore it is an effect that belongs to God alone. Therefore, in every action of
natural beings, since they somehow cause being, God is the cause of that
action, inasmuch as every agent is an instrument of the divine power caus-
ing being.
These last two ways of causing the action of another appear to be quite
similar. Aquinas, unfortunately, does not expand on their difference, and
this might be why these dynamic features of God’s action in nature are
usually disregarded. If we recall Aquinas’s account of instrumental causes,
10 Although these ways are also explained in Rudi te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in
Thomas Aquinas ðLeiden: Brill, 1995Þ, 165–66, no author within the contemporary debate has
taken them into account. Even though it is true that in his new book Dodds does look into
these two ways, there seem to be some issues with his characterization. In his chapter on divine
action ðchap. 5Þ, their distinction is marked so strongly ðeven using different terminologyÞ that
their relation could seem unclear to the unfamiliar reader. Later on, Dodds seems to simplify
the distinction using the terminology he sets up to distinguish these two ways as synonyms
when discussing evolution ð199 n. 136Þ. In addition, in the following chapter, these distinctions
are not used to discuss the way that God’s action interplays with secondary causes in the case,
for example, of chance ð216–25Þ. These issues prompt me to revisit Aquinas’s De potentia Dei
to clarify his position and advance in our understanding of his doctrine. This being said, how-
ever, it is very good to know that to a certain extent the arguments present in De potentia Dei
are back on the discussion table.
11 As explained in Aquinas, Summa theologiae ðST Þ I, 2, 3, co.
12 Aquinas, SCG III, 67: “everyone that operates is in some way a cause of being.”
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however, we will find the difference. Every instrument, when acting as an
instrument, has two different effects: one that pertains to it according to its
The Journal of Religionown nature, and another that pertains to it insofar as it is moved by the
primary agent and that transcends its own nature.13 The first effect is proper
to itself, according to its own nature. For instance, cutting is proper to a
knife by virtue of the sharpness intrinsic to it. The second effect, which the
instrument has according to the action of the principal agent, always goes
beyond its own nature, that is, the instrumental cause could not perform it
unless the principal agent would cause it to act in that particular manner, as
when a man uses a knife to cut his steak in a precise manner, something the
knife by itself could not do ðgiven that the definition of a knife includes the
causal power of cutting, though it does not include cutting in this or that
mannerÞ, and the man could not do either without the knife ðor another
similar instrumentÞ. It is, however, through the first effect ðthat which per-
tains to the instrument by its own natureÞ that the second effect ðthat which
is according to the principal agentÞ is performed. This is the reason why this,
and not another, instrument is used to accomplish this particular effect.
Nevertheless, neither the first nor the second effect could be caused by the
instrument were it not moved by the principal agent. Therefore, both the
first and second effects ðcutting, and cutting in such a mannerÞ can be at-
tributed to the instrument because it is in the knife’s nature to cut, it is the
knife’s causal power to do so. It can also be attributed to the principal agent,
because it is by the man’s applying the knife’s causal power that the knife
cuts, and cuts in this or that manner.
In De potentia Dei, when Aquinas explains how God acts in nature through
natural agents, using them as instrumental causes affirming that every agent
in every action is an instrumental cause of God’s action, he uses the analogy
of instrumental causality according to both ways of causing by the instru-
ment: in applying their causal powers to act, and in achieving an effect that
goes beyond the natural agent’s causal power. In the first way, Aquinas un-
derstands that God is applying the natural agent to achieve its own natural
effect, which follows from the nature of the instrument, while in the second
way God uses the natural agent in order to produce something that goes
beyond the natural agent’s own causal power. What goes beyond the natural
agent’s own causal power is the instantiation of being, which is attributable
13 It is important to note here that Aquinas is trying to explain how from an action made by
an agent ðthe principal agentÞ using an instrument, the instrumental cause achieves some-
thing that goes beyond its own capacity. Aquinas has offered different opinions about this
subject throughout his writings. When he discusses problems of divine revelation, like the in-
carnation or the sacraments, he invokes the “two action doctrine”; while when he discusses
how God acts in every natural agent, he admits that there is only one action in the principal
and instrumental agent. For the former, see Scriptum super III Sententiis, 18, 1, 1, 4; ST III, 19, 1,
co.; ST III, 62, 4, co.; and for the latter, see SCG III, 70. Nevertheless, in De pot., 3, 7 and in ST I,
105, 5, co., both of which are later than SCG ðthough earlier than ST IIIÞ, he discusses how God
acts through secondary causes without arguing for either doctrine. He simply states that the
natural agent is an instrument of God.
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only to God, because only God can cause being. We need to bear in mind
that no finite agent can be understood to produce a particular effect into
Revisiting Aquinas on Providencebeing. This can happen only if it is made to do so by the immanence of the
universal power that accounts for being as such: the primary cause of being.
Then, if the natural agent is considered in itself, it is immediate to its effect.
The cause of an action, however, is that by whose causal power it is done,
more even than that which does it. God, then, is the cause of the effect of
every secondary ðinstrumentalÞ cause.
Yet, the instrumental cause causes the second effect, that which goes
beyond its own power, by causing its natural effect, which is done by receiv-
ing the power from the principal cause.14 What is, then, done by receiving
the power from the principal cause? Is it the second effect or the first effect
of the instrumental cause? The answer is simple: both. The knife is moved
by the man to cut, and to do it in such a manner. Without the man’s power,
the knife could not cut, but without the edge of the knife the man could
not cut in this manner. In this same way, God moves the natural agent to
cause its own natural effect and achieves an effect that goes beyond the
power of that natural agent. This is what Aquinas meant when, years be-
fore, he said in De veritate, “the effect does not follow from the first cause,
unless the secondary cause is present.”15 Thus, the effect is more similar
to the secondary cause because the causal power of the secondary cause is
that which determines the production of this effect, and not another. In
some sense, the secondary ðinstrumentalÞ cause determines the action of
the primary cause toward this particular effect.16 Because of this Aquinas
can claim that even though the divine will is unfailing, some of its effects
are necessary and some are contingent,17 as I will show in the next section.
Consequently, God works in and through every natural agent inasmuch
as every natural agent needs his causal power in order to act. God is the
cause of everything’s action inasmuch as he gives everything the causal
power to act, preserves that causal power in being ðfounding momentsÞ,
and applies it to action, and inasmuch as by his power every other causal
power acts ðdynamic momentsÞ.
There is, however, an important question to be raised here: can the
dynamic moments of God’s action be reduced to the founding moments?
If this were the case, then there would be no reason for this essay. I believe
not. The dynamic moments of God’s action are, at least in Aquinas’s ac-
count, fully necessary to explain the way in which God can be said to act in
14 Aquinas also explains this by using the language of participation. Hence, he argues that by
participating in the power of the principal agent to produce the second effect, the instrument
needs to participate in the power of the principal agent to produce its own effect, and this will
be what is meant by the principal agent applying the powers of the instrument to its own ðthe
instrument’sÞ effect. See Questiones disputatae de veritate ðDe ver.Þ, 5, 9, 7.
15 De ver., 5, 9, 12.
16 De ver., 5, 9, 10.
17 Expositio libri Peri hermeneias ðIn Peri herm.Þ I, lect. 14.
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the created universe. Aquinas requires expanding his doctrine of divine
action with the dynamic moments because he understands that natural
The Journal of Religionagents need God’s power to act. Thus, the description of God’s action as
creating and sustaining is, in a sense, not enough. I do not want to suggest
that Aquinas thought that there are four different actions in God with
respect to creation. On the contrary, Aquinas presents a fourfold account
of God’s unique and sole action. Nevertheless, these four aspects need to be
considered to appreciate the full strength of his doctrine. A failure to do
so opens the path for multiple objections, such as the claim that God is only
sustaining the universe and its laws in existence, without participating ac-
tively in it.18 Ultimately, these dynamic moments plainly present God’s con-
tinuous involvement in the history of the universe, making fully explicit
Aquinas’s doctrine of primary and secondary causation.
The causal powers of a natural thing require the divine power and are
enough in their own account, since God and natural agents act on two dif-
ferent levels.19 For this reason the same effect is ascribed to a natural cause
and to God, not as though a part of the effect were performed by God and
a part by the natural agent. The whole effect proceeds from each, yet in dif-
ferent ways, in the same manner that the whole of the one same effect is
ascribed to the instrument and to the principal agent. It is in this respect, in
the acting together of the two orders of primary and secondary causes, that
Aquinas argues that the causal powers of nature do not suffice to produce
their effects. Similarly, an artisan can give the axe its sharpness as a perma-
nent form, but not his acting power as a permanent form. The axe needs
the artisan to apply the causal power to cut. Analogically, it is necessary for
natural agents to receive that power from the first cause, which is God, to
cause actually, in the same way the axe, although it has the form to do it,
could not chop a piece of wood unless it is moved by the craftsman. The
craftsman gives the axe the power withwhich the axe actually chops the wood
according to its sharpness. In a similar manner, God gives natural things the
power to perform their operations according to their own natures.
As a final cautionary note, it should be said that this intriguing picture
of God’s action should be framed within Aquinas’s doctrine of the names
of God and analogical predication. If this is not done, it is easy to find ob-
jections and claims that, when affirming that God moves secondary causes
to cause, or applies the causal powers of natural agents as a principal agent
applies the causal power of an instrument, a movement prior to the action
of the natural agent is assumed, which implies an extra causal relation be-
tween the primary cause and the natural agent. Thus, the same effect is not
18 John Polkinghorne would be someone who objects Aquinas’s doctrine of divine action
in this way; see, e.g., “The Metaphysics of Divine Action,” inChaos and Complexity, ed. Robert
John Russell, Nancey C. Murphy, and Arthur Robert Peacocke ðRome: Vatican Observatory–
CTNS, 1995Þ, 147–56.
19 De pot., 3, 7, 1, and ST I, 105, 5, 2.
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attributed to both God and the natural agent. The first effect is the move-
ment of the natural agent ðcaused by God’s actionÞ and the second effect
Revisiting Aquinas on Providenceis whatever the natural agent causes through that movement. However, this
position, in the first place, does not fully understand Aquinas’s doctrine of
instrumental causality and, in the second place, forgets that it is an analogy,
which should be taken and understood as such, without asking more than
it can provide: the idea that the effect is completely produced by God and
by the natural agent, as a man using a knife produces two pieces of bread
from just one.
II. GOD’S SPECIAL PROVIDENTIAL ACTIONAquinas’s doctrine, thus, accounts for an autonomous natural causality
that, at the same time, depends completely on God’s causal powers. In this
way, Aquinas conceives God as acting constantly, intimately, and providen-
tially in and through every activity of natural agents, fully involved in the
development of the history of the universe and humanity.
The question, then, is whether this account can rise to the challenge
of the contemporary debate. For Aquinas, the key feature of a provident
act is ordinare in finem.20 God’s providence, in addition, reaches all created
being because God orders all beings to its end. These key features are shared
by most of the authors within the contemporary debate on divine action.
Robert Russell, for example, states that the doctrine of “providence stresses
that God is the cause of the meaning and purpose of all that is. God not
only creates but guides and directs the universe towards the fulfilling of
God’s purposes.”21 Nicholas Saunders shows how all the authors partici-
pating in the debate accept these definitions.22
The essential difference between Aquinas’s considerations and those
of these authors, however, is that Aquinas teaches that God’s providence
not only guides the totality of the universe as such but also rules each sin-
gular event in its own individuality, by and through secondary causes.23
Within the contemporary debate, the distinction between general divine
action and special divine action is made to account for creation and sus-
tainment of the universe and for those particular actions that happen hic
et nunc and that promote God’s goals for the universe and humanity.24
Although general divine action refers to all events in nature, it is not con-
ceived as an action that reaches particular events. Otherwise, it would be
20 SCG III, 73, and ST I, 22, 1, co.
21 See Robert Russell, Cosmology: From Alpha to Omega ðMinneapolis: Fortress, 2008Þ, 113.
22 See Nicholas Saunders, Divine Action and Modern Science ðCambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002Þ, 19–23.
23 ST I, 22, 2, co., and De pot., 6, 6, co.
24 See Saunders, Divine Action, 21; and George F. R. Ellis, “Ordinary and Extraordinary
Divine Action: The Nexus of Interaction,” in Russell, Murphy, and Peacocke, Chaos and Com-
plexity, 359–395, esp. 371–74 and 379–83.
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unnecessary to distinguish it from special providence, which refers to those
events in which God acts directly and immediately in the universe. Aquinas,
The Journal of Religionon the other hand, suggests that it is not necessary to duplicate God’s action
in this manner. God’s causality extends not only to the ways in which nature
works but also to the singular particular beings. Each singular being is di-
rected by God’s primary causality, which means that everything that is cre-
ated is providentially guided by God. This difference will prove to be es-
sential for understanding God’s action in the universe.
The question is how God acts providentially for every singular being,
given that it is neither evident nor apparent that this is so. This is the
key problem of the contemporary debate on divine action. According to
Aquinas, natural agents are the real causes of their effects since God, as
the first cause of the existence of each being, is also the first cause of the
causal powers of that being. An objection appears rapidly against this per-
spective: Take these actions of natural agents via which God is supposedly
guiding and influencing the course of events. Are these actions events that
occur according to the ordinary course of nature? If so, it is hard to see
how God could be influencing things in the way that parties to the divine
action debate want him to be able to influence things. For if all the natural
actions that occur are just what occur according to the order of nature,
then God would not seem to exercise any more guidance over nature than
does the God of deism. On the other hand, if some of those events are
outside the ordinary course of nature, then Aquinas’s view seems to entail
that God cannot influence the world without acting against its order.
I presented four different ways in which Aquinas understands that God
can be attributed with an effect of another agent. Starting with the found-
ing moments of God’s acting in nature Aquinas says that God causes the
natural agent’s effect because God is the cause of the natural agent’s causal
power to cause that effect, given that God is the source of everything that
exists ðcausal powers includedÞ. Second, similar to how in creation we dis-
tinguish between creatio and conservatio, God also maintains those causal pow-
ers in existence. Hence God can also be said to be the cause of what is caused
by those causal powers. These two ways, although they pertain, doubtless,
to the realm of efficient causality, refer to that which is understood in
the contemporary debate to be the general divine providence or general
divine action, which refers to the creation and sustainment of the uni-
verse and its components in existence. As I mentioned before, unfortu-
nately most authors who argue for a Thomistic account of divine action
in nature stop their review of Aquinas’s proposal at this point, which re-
sults in objections claiming that this stance does not solve the problem
of particular actions of God hic et nunc.
To attempt at a solution, it is necessary to reconsider the other two ways
of God acting through secondary causes: what I have called the dynamic
moments of God’s acting in nature, in which the analogy of instrumen-
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tal causality is involved. According to Aquinas, God applies the power of the
natural being to act and uses the natural agent in its action to produce an
Revisiting Aquinas on Providenceeffect that goes beyond the natural agent’s power. Both times Aquinas in-
troduces the analogy of instrumental causality to explain what he means
and how both effects of the secondary cause can be attributed completely
to God and to the natural agent: “God is the cause of all actions, inasmuch
as every agent is the instrument of the divine power acting.”25
God, then, is said to act in and through each natural agent in order to
achieve effects that transcend the nature of the secondary causes. Given
that God acts in each action of each natural agent and that every act of
God follows his reason and will, it follows that these actions are provident
actions. This, however, does not deny or diminish the action of natural
agents. God is, then, influencing providentially the course of nature with
his will and reason, by moving the secondary causes to actually cause and
to achieve the goals that he seeks for the universe. Aquinas is, then, strongly
arguing for a God who is so powerful that he allows secondary causes to
be real causes of his providential action.
God’s providential activity, as taught by Aquinas, has two features, namely,
the planning and the execution of that plan. The planning, ordering, or dis-
position corresponds to God’s intelligence, while the execution corresponds
to God’s will.26 This execution, Aquinas argues, is performed through the
created secondary causes. Nevertheless, given that every action of every nat-
ural agent can be attributed to God as its primary and principal cause in the
fourfold manner explained above, particularly in the dynamic moments,
and that God’s action is always a provident action, God’s action extends to
all being, universally and particularly. Thus Aquinas can affirm that “that
which comes from the operation of the secondary causes is subject to the
divine providence,”27 meaning that it is God acting through every second-
ary cause to carry his special providence. God is continuously active in the
universe, and that action is a providential action, given that even through
“created things, God does not act by necessity, but by his will and intel-
lect.”28 This means that the divine action, considered from creation’s per-
spective, is an intentional action happening hic et nunc, that is, when each
natural agent acts, at any given time and place: “God acts in all secondary
causes, and their effects are to be referred to God as their cause: thus any-
thing that is done in these particulars, is his own work.”29
It is my contention that this providential action is to be understood in
terms of the contemporary debate’s special providential divine action, solv-
ing, thus, the objections raised above. It seems to me that what the authors
25 De pot., 3, 7, co.
26 SCG III, 71.
27 Ibid., 77.
28 Ibid., 75.
29 Ibid.
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in the contemporary debate intend by the adjective special when charac-
terizing God’s action is that God acts willingly, providentially—that is, that
The Journal of ReligionGod acts guiding the world and its creatures to the goal and ends he wisely
seeks. Plantinga has expressed that “perhaps there is a way in which God
can act specially in the world, and do so in a manner that accommodates
those concerns ½about an interventionist account for divine action. Then,
even if we don’t know what intervention is, we could still specify a mode
of divine action that isn’t subject to those objections.”30 This is precisely
what Aquinas does when explaining that God acts providentially in every
natural action of every natural agent. In fact, Aquinas’s perspective also
solves the theological objection that claimed that God would not be con-
sistent when intervening within nature. There is no need to look for an-
other kind of divine action in the world that does not go against the con-
temporary scientific theories to explain how God guides, governs, or directs
the universe toward its end.
There is one extra feature that Aquinas gives in his account of divine
providence that I have not yet treated. Surprisingly for many, according
to Aquinas, the notion of divine providence requires the natural world to
include some kind of indeterminism and contingency regarding the effects
of the natural agents. As can be expected, however, Aquinas’s reasons are
very different from those given by the authors of the contemporary debate.
It is not because the theological certainty of special divine providence re-
quires ontological causal gaps in nature ðsome kind of natural ontological
indeterminism as Russell, Murphy and Ellis, and Tracy would requireÞ,31
but because the universe would be imperfect if this kind of causality ðcon-
tingent causalityÞ were not included in it.
Aquinas looks at the universe as consisting of a gradual hierarchy of
beings. Those that are higher, act more perfectly, whereas those that are
lower in that hierarchy can fail in their activities. Aquinas thinks that a
more perfect universe is that which includes all modes of being, not only
those that act of necessity, but also those that act contingently and that
can sometimes fail in their action.32 Having affirmed that God’s providen-
tial actions are through secondary causes, Aquinas asserts that divine prov-
idence should not exclude the contingent mode of causing in order to
make the universe more perfect.33 Aquinas wants to include not only his
30 Alvin Plantinga,“What Is Intervention?”Theology and Science 6, no. 4 ð2008Þ: 369–401, quota-
tion on 391.
31 RobertRussell, “Does ‘TheGodWhoActs’ReallyAct?,”TheologyToday 54,no.1 ð1997Þ: 43–65,
44–45; Nancey Murphy and Geroge F. R. Ellis,On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cos-
mology, and Ethics ðMinneapolis: Fortress, 1996Þ, 214; and Thomas Tracy, “Particular Providence
and the God of the Gaps,” in Russell, Murphy, and Peacocke,Chaos and Complexity, 289–324,
esp. 294 and 310.
32 SCG III, 74: “It would be against the perfection of the universe if there was nothing
corruptible, or if no power would fail ½in producing its effect.”
33 Ibid., 72, and in 74: “It is against the notion of divine providence that there is nothing
casual or random in things.”
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doctrine on the human free will,34 but also his teachings on natural actions
that happen ut in paucioribus, that is, those events that happen out of the con-
Revisiting Aquinas on Providencetingent activity of natural agents ðtoday we might say events that happen out
of the indeterminate character of natureÞ, showing that even when God
causes each natural action in the fourfold manner explained above, this
does not deny that these natural agents are contingent in their activity and
in their causal capacities, being able, potentially, to fail in the realization of
the determined effect of their natures.35
To show how these contingent—indeterminate, random or chanceful—
events are also guided by God’s providential action, Aquinas explains that
any natural agent is under the divine providence in two different ways: ð1Þ as
ordered to itself, and ð2Þ as ordered to something else. Those events that
happen according to what the agent intended ðintention understood as the
final cause that proceeds from the nature of the natural agentÞ36 by its own
nature fall under both ways of understanding providence: they act accord-
ing to what was expected from them—according to the laws of nature, we
could also say today—and in doing so guided by the divine will and wisdom.
On the other hand, those events that happen due to the failure of the agent
ðut in paucioribusÞ fall under the second way of understanding the provi-
dential act.37 In this case, an event that was not determined in its cause
but nevertheless happened, that is, a random event, is also guided by the
divine providence, because it is caused by God as its first cause. This kind
of event falls under the second way of understanding the providential act:
God, even by means of a contingent natural agent ða deficient instrument
in the analogy used aboveÞ, by causing it to cause in the four ways explained
above achieves his goals and intentions. Referring to the previously dis-
cussed fourfold understanding of divine action in nature, I would risk saying
that, just as in instrumental causality the principal agent has goals ðintentioÞ
that are not included in the causal power of the instrument but that are
nevertheless achieved, God, as principal agent, even when acting through
contingent causes, reaches his goals. In words of Elizabeth Johnson “im-
manent in these ½contingent and natural processes, divine providential
purposes come to fruition by means of purposes inherent in creatures them-
selves.”38
34 This discussion on divine action as the first cause of every event in creation puts forward
the question of human free will and moral evil. Much has been said about these topics, and I
do not have the space to address these here. My goal is simply to reformulate Aquinas’s ideas
on divine action as to help the contemporary debate to see his contribution.
35 Aquinas discusses this doctrine in SCG III, 39; ST I, 63, 9, co.; In Peri herm., 14; De ver., 3, 1, co.;
Quaestiones disputatae de malo, 1, 3, 17; In libros de caelo et mundo expositio, 9; Sententia libri metaphysicae,
2, 3; SCG III, 99.
36 See, e.g., SCG II, 30: “in natural things, the intention of the end belongs to the agent
according to its form . . . thus the natural thing tends to the end according to the virtue of its
form.”
37 De ver., 5, 4.
38 Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?,” 14.
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Aquinas can, then, argue that from a contingent or indeterminate cause
ð“contingent” in the sense that it produces effects that are not determined
The Journal of Religionin its natureÞ God accomplishes something better in the universe. In fact,
he explains elsewhere that even though the intentio of the secondary cause
does not extend to the indeterminate effect ðbecause it fails to reach its
natural effectÞ, God’s intention does extend to the effect by ordering these
new indeterminate effects to new good things in the universe.39 In fact, Aqui-
nas goes even further to affirm that, because God providentially guides the
whole, some natural events will happen contingently, in the sense that they
will occur according to God’s intentio even though they do not follow the
particular secondary cause’s intentio.40 In this way, Aquinas’s ideas help solve
the question about events happening outside the ordinary course of nature
by explaining that even those that happen randomly or by chance are prov-
identially guided by God’s continuous action.
III. CONCLUSIONWith this doctrine Aquinas can respond, for example, to Robert Russell’s
concerns of finding a way in which God, without going against contem-
porary scientific theories, can accomplish results that could not be accom-
plished were nature completely deterministic. Russell finds it necessary to
admit a special divine action within a particular indeterministic quantum
state to reach a particular effect that will promote God’s goals within crea-
tion, though not necessarily expected by the scientific theory. Aquinas’s ac-
count does not need this kind of action. Through the indeterminacies of
nature, given that God acts in every single action of every single agent as the
primary cause of that action, and given that the actions of natural agents
can fail in the production of their effects, God can reach providentially new
instantiations of being that would be better for the entire universe or a part
of it. Thus, God guides the universe toward the end he determined by being
the principal efficient cause using an instrument.
Absolutely everything that exists proceeds from God. Not only the be-
ing of natural things proceeds from God, but also their causal powers,
because these, as their principle of action, are also created. With this de-
39 Stephen L. Brock, “Causality and Necessity in Thomas Aquinas”Quaestio 2 ð2002Þ: 217–
240, 228, expresses that “there are coincidences in the world because God wants there to be.”
For Aquinas’s reference, see SCG III, 74.
40 SCG III, 94: “the intention of the particular agent differs from that of the universal agent:
for the particular agent aims at the good of the part absolutely, and makes it as good as it can;
whereas the universal agent aims at the good of the whole. Consequently a defect is beside the
intention of the particular agent, but according to the intention of the universal agent.”ST I,
19, 8, co.: “It is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by
God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being his
will that they should happen contingently.”
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scription of creation Aquinas concludes that the causal power of God is
given, or participated in neo-Platonic fashion, to natural agents, and they
Revisiting Aquinas on Providenceact by that power. In the same way we can say that each being that par-
ticipates in God’s being possesses that being, it also possesses the causal
power in which it participates from God.
Thus Aquinas finds it possible to conceive of a God who continuously
creates being and the causal powers of natural agents ðwhen giving that
beingÞ. His creative action shows God to be completely distinct from crea-
tures, while they are completely dependent on God. Even more, Aquinas
conceives of God as constantly acting in and through natural agents in the
created universe.
A brief commentary should be dedicated, at least, to the problem of
evil. I have not dealt with it, but I am aware of the dramatic implications
of the picture I have presented: if God is the ultimate cause of everything
that exists and occurs in the created universe, then God would be to blame
for evil. Aquinas was also aware of the problem. However, it is important
to stress that with this doctrine Aquinas explains how everything which is
good ðwhich in the end, for Aquinas, is everything which isÞ is caused by God.
Evil, as privation of good, is not, and therefore, properly speaking, is not
caused.41
Thus, acting through secondary causes, God providentially guides as
the first cause the development of the universe and the history of human-
ity. Causing as a first cause, however, God does not interfere with the cau-
sality of secondary causes. God is rather the very source of their causality.
This is why Aquinas says that God is universally present in all things and
events.42 This presence, however, is not merely generic. Instead, it is fun-
damentally a particular activity through each of the secondary acting causes.
God is constantly active in the universe, in a providential manner to guide
the lives of men and women, and indeed all creation, to their and its end
and fulfillment, through secondary contingent causes. Theologically, Aqui-
nas will argue that this end is God’s glory. As he states in his commentary
on the Gospel of John: “although it was not ordained to this from the in-
tention of its natural cause, yet from the intention of the divine providence
it was ordained to the glory of God.”43
41 For thoughtful considerations on this question, the reader can refer to Brian Davies’s new
volume, Thomas Aquinas on God and Evil ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2011Þ, or Jacques
Maritain’s God and the Permission of Evil ðMilwaukee: Bruce, 1966Þ. Along these lines, see Agustı´n
Echavarrı´a, “Thomas Aquinas and the Modern and Contemporary Debate on Evil,” New
Blackfriars 95 (2013): 733–54. For a different approach, Eleonore Stump’sWandering in Darkness
ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2010Þ offers valuable insights on evil and suffering.
42 ST I, 8, 1, co.: “Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it. . . . Now,
being is that which is maximally intimate in each thing, and which is most profound in
everything. . . . Hence it is necessary that God is in all things, and intimately.”
43 Aquinas, Lectura super Ioannem, 11, l, 1.
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